This paper proposes a new framework for studying federal mandates regarding public policies in areas such as environmental quality, public health, highway safety, and the provision of local public goods. Voters have single-peaked preferences along a single policy dimension. There are two levels of government, federal and local. The federal level can constrain local policy by mandating a minimum (or maximum) policy. Localities are free to adopt any policy satisfying the constraint imposed by the federal mandate. We show that voters choose federal mandates that are too strict, which leads to excessively severe mandates. We show that similar results can obtain when federal provision of the publicprovided good is more efficient than local provision.
I. Introduction
Many policies are determined through a combination of decisions at various levels of government. Policy makers at a higher level of government specify guidelines that must be satisfied by policies decided at lower levels. For example, the Environmental Protection Agency establishes emissions standards for gasoline-powered vehicles, which may then We wish to thank Laboratoire Commun de Recherche en É conomie de l'Environnement, de l'É nergie et du Secteur Public for financial support. Useful comments were provided by Jenna Bednar, Jean Tirole, a referee, and the editor, as well as seminar participants at Virginia Polytechnic Institute, Toulouse, Munich, Lisbon, the 1998 meeting of the Public Choice Society, and the 1998 Wallis Conference in Political Economy.
be strengthened (but not relaxed) by each state. Other examples include educational curriculum and service requirements and highway and workplace safety standards. Some kinds of government expenditures also follow this pattern: for example, the federal government provides basic welfare support to poor families with children, which is often supplemented by state welfare grants; federal income taxes are determined by Congress, and additional income taxes can be imposed by states and municipalities. The same pattern can be found in the European Union, where, for instance, the European Court of Justice imposes minimum standards of respect for certain human rights or the European Commission imposes a minimum amount of competition in network industries.
Observers often complain that the constraints imposed by central levels of government on local levels are too strict. More precisely, there are circumstances in which central governments intervene even when interjurisdictional externalities are minimal, in which case such intervention is difficult to explain in terms of efficiency gains. Consider, for instance, the fact that grants given by the U.S. government to states for maintenance of highways are reduced if they do not raise the drinking age to 21, or the fact that U.S. regulations require local governments to move city fuel tanks above ground (Peterson 1995) . Following the lead of the public choice school, most economists and political scientists would, we surmise, interpret this excessive intervention by central governments as the consequence of power grabbing by politicians.
The main message of this paper is that such excessive interference has deeper roots. It is a "normal" consequence of the behavior of voters and a probably unavoidable feature of federal systems. Local political fights have a tendency to spill over at the federal level, as voters will try to have their preferred policy imposed at both levels of government. Recent political debates in the European Union provide many examples: the staunchest defenders of "subsidiarity" 1 on some issues become ardent advocates of European intervention on others. A report to the French Senate (La Malène 1996/97) gives striking examples. For instance, through a resolution of November 18, 1992, the European Parliament has expressed its support to the principle of subsidiarity. This did not prevent its Environmental Commission from complaining when a text on the reduction of water pollution by water mills was withdrawn from the agenda.
In order to study mandates, we examine the equilibrium of a hierarchical pattern of policy making in which, at each level, decisions are made by majority vote. We identify the equilibrium effects of multiple layers of government and compare the outcomes under the hierarchical system of mandates to the outcomes that arise if policies are determined either exclusively at the federal level or exclusively at the local level.
Our model is based on the standard one-dimensional spatial model, in which voters have single-peaked preferences and political competition produces median voter outcomes. Policies at both the federal and state levels are determined according to majority rule equilibrium. The federal mandate is set in the first stage, and it becomes a lower bound to the policy choice of each district in the second stage.
We first consider a baseline case, without externalities or other possible sources of efficiency gains from federal intervention. We find that voters will vote sincerely at each stage, and therefore there will be stricter standards with the hierarchical structure than with a system in which policy is determined entirely at the local level. Furthermore, there will be less variance of policy outcomes across local jurisdictions. More voters are made worse off than better off, compared to a world without federal mandates.
We then extend the model to allow for efficiency gains from federal intervention. We do this by modeling the local public good outcome as the sum of a level provided by the federal government (similar to a mandate) plus whatever additional amount the district chooses to produce locally. Local production of the public good is assumed to be less efficient than production by the federal government because of economies of scale (or scope) or greater efficiency of federal taxation. Even with significant efficiency gains from federal provision, majority voting can still lead to a higher level of provision than would be optimal under a utilitarian welfare criterion. Finally, we show that, surprisingly, the level of federal expenditures will be higher the more efficient the local governments are at providing public goods.
While our framework is, as far as we know, entirely new to the literature, a number of papers touch on related issues. Bednar (1998) and de Figueiredo and Weingast (1997) investigate and discuss the impacts of and pressures leading to federal encroachment of the kind that has preoccupied constitutional scholars and designers for centuries. In the public finance literature, Nechyba (1997a Nechyba ( , 1997b has studied equilibrium properties of financing locally public projects through a combination of income taxes (which normally occur at state or national levels) and property taxes (which normally are imposed by local authorities). There is also a vast literature in the field of regulation that addresses the specific effects of federal standards in a variety of applied settings including product safety, air and water quality, public health standards, and other policy domains. However, none of this formally models the interaction of federal regulatory agencies and regulatory authorities at lower levels of government.
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The theory presented in this paper is mostly positive, but it should inform normative theories, as illustrated by the comparison of the efficiency regimes of different federalist regimes of Section IV. We discuss this link, as well as the relationship to a broader research program, in Section V.
The remainder of the paper is organized in the following way. Section II presents the basic model and results. Section III explores the extension to allow for efficiency gains from federal provision. Section IV presents an extended parametric example that illustrates the welfare properties of the equilibrium. Section V discusses directions for further research.
II. The Basic Model
We consider a confederation composed of D districts, where D is an odd integer equal to at least three. Each district has an odd number of voters.
Voters have complete and transitive preferences over the policy space
represented by the utility function where is the policy The median ideal policy in district d is The median m p med {t }.
ideal policy for all voters in all districts will be called M. To simplify the exposition we assume that no two voters have the same ideal policy. We make no specific assumptions about the correlation of preferences across or within districts. In particular, we do not rule out the kind of correlation of preferences that might naturally arise because of sorting à la Tiebout.
A. Federal Mandate Chosen by Referendum
Voting takes place in two stages: first a federal mandate is chosen, and second each district chooses its own policy, constrained by this mandate. Voters are assumed to have no specific information about the other voters, and our results rely on dominant strategies. Formally, the voting game is modeled as the following two-stage majoritarian game, in which at each stage each voter announces an ideal policy. The one-stage version of the game we use was first studied by Moulin (1980) , who showed that a mechanism that chooses a policy that is the median of the declared favored policy of the voters is "straightforward," in the sense that it offers no opportunities for the voters to manipulate it, regardless of their belief about the strategies of other voters (see also Border and Jordan 1983 To identify the equilibrium of this game, we first show that the second stage of this voting scheme is strategy-proof (it is an equilibrium to have all voters vote their ideal policy) for any outcome of the first stage. We then show that in the first stage players have a unique dominant strategy given that other players' reports in the second stage are truthful.
3 This finding that in equilibrium voters do not strategically underreport their preferences in the first stage of the game (setting the federal mandate) plays a central role in driving our results.
We call this a sequentially dominant strategy equilibrium. We denote by the equilibrium outcomes in the two stages and by * * *
The unique equilibrium outcome of the game is described in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. The equilibrium outcome of the two-stage voting game is a standard equal to the mean of the types of all voters, and * F p M, an outcome in each district equal to the maximum of M and the district median, preferred policy, as though there were no second local stage: there is no strategic underreporting of preferences. The formal proof is presented in the Appendix, but its basic idea is simple. First, because preferences are single-peaked on it is a dominant strategy for voters [F, ϩ ϱ) 
only that F be smaller than m d , and in order to obtain this, he or she might as well vote t id . Hence, whatever the relationship between t id and m d , a voter cannot do better than voting t id . Theorem 1 enables us to prove several interesting properties of the equilibria that help understand the consequences of the presence of a federal level.
Property 1. For every district, and for at least one district, *
That is, the effect of federal mandates is to weakly increase the policy level in every district and strictly increase the policy in at least one district. The districts in which federal mandates lead to a strict increase are those low-demand districts with
Because we have assumed
that no two voters share the same ideal policy, that every district has an odd number of voters, and that there are at least three districts, there exists at least one low-demand district, with and hence
We now turn to the consequences of these facts for the welfare of voters.
Property 2. Voters in high-demand districts in which are
unaffected by a federal mandate.
In high-demand districts, the outcome is the same outcome * This property follows from the fact that federal mandates do not lower the policy in any district. A locally low-demand voter would be
better off only if the federal mandate actually lowered the local policy, which can never happen. If, in addition, this locally low-demand voter resides in a low-demand district, then the federal mandate produces a strict increase in the local policy, which makes the voter strictly worse off. Property 4. Voters for whom are made strictly better off
by a federal mandate. The logic behind this is analogous to the logic behind property 3, but with an additional twist. A locally high-demand voter is
made better off if the federal mandate raises the local policy, but only if it does not raise it too much. If this locally high-demand voter resides in a low-demand district, then the federal mandate produces a strict increase in the local policy, which makes the voter strictly better off, and if the voter's type is greater than the overall median, the federal mandate certainly increases his or her utility. Property 5. Voters for whom may be either better off or
worse off with a federal mandate. If the mandate produces an outcome greater than t id .
Since preferences are single-peaked and m d and M lie on opposite sides of voter t's ideal policy, the utility derived from policy M (resulting from the federal mandate) can be either greater or less than the utility derived from policy m d . Property 6. There are more voters that are made worse off by a federal mandate than there are voters that are made better off.
By property 2, voters in high-demand districts are unaffected by mandates. Therefore, only voters from low-demand districts are affected. From property 1 there is at least one low-demand district, and from property 3 more than half of the voters from such districts (those for whom ) are made worse off.
Property 6 can be interpreted as a negative verdict on the welfare consequences of federal mandates in our framework. Given that the standard approach to constitutional design in economics and in social choice theory is to look for constitutions that maximize some measure of welfare, this result begs the question of the reason for the presence of federal mandates in the first place. One immediate answer is that it would be impossible to constitutionally rule out federal intervention in policy areas with little or no economic benefit to federal intervention while encouraging it in policy areas with greater economic benefits from intervention. The problem is simply that it is very difficult to provide ex ante a delimitation between those issues that are genuinely motivated by the presence of significant economic benefits from intervention and those issues that are not. In either case, "high-demand" voters would pressure for federal intervention. Thus, regardless of the care with which such lines would be drawn, some issues will be open to federal intervention even with minimal external benefits or economies. La Malène (1996/97) provides an example of this tendency of local political fights to spill over at the federal level. In 1994, the delegation for Europe of the French Chambre des Députés judged that a proposed European directive on poverty was contrary to the principle of subsidiarity. When a resolution to the effect came to the floor, it was impossible to direct the debate away from the substantial issues involved toward the constitutional aspects, and the Chambre approved the proposed directive.
B. Federal Mandate Chosen by a Representative Legislature
We have assumed that the federal standard was chosen by a mechanism in which all voters from all districts vote. In many settings federal policies are actually chosen by representative legislative bodies. This will also lead to excessive federal intervention. In order to study this issue, we introduce a variation of our model in which each district elects a representative, and these representatives vote on the federal standard. This adds a stage to our basic game as follows:
Stage 1: Each voter announces a policy, and the median vote in each district is used as the district's vote for the federal mandate. 4 Stage 2: The federal mandate, F, is given by the median of the median votes of each district.
Stage 3: In each district, each voter votes for a policy in [F, ϩϱ) , and the policy x d implemented in district d is the median of the votes at this stage.
Because the third stage of the game is the same as above, it is still true that voters will vote for their ideal policy. We show in the Appendix that in the first stage (when they vote for their representative) voters still have a dominant strategy to vote for their true ideal policy. The intuition behind this result is very similar to the intuition behind theorem 1. The only difference is that the interval in which the voter can move F is determined by the district to which he or she belongs.
This implies that the federal standard is equal to the median of the median types of each district: Depending on the distribution of types, M d can be smaller than, equal to, or greater than M. To see this, consider a simple example with three districts each containing three voters. Suppose that the ideal points are aligned as follows: 
III. Substitution between Federal and Local Policy
In this section, we study a particular application of federal mandates, in which there is a local public good that is provided by a combination of federal and local expenditures. There are many examples of this, such as police and public safety, education, and transportation infrastructure. While some of these applications involve more than two levels of government funding decisions, the basic ideas can be captured by a simple modification of our two-layer model of the previous section. This enables us to address questions about the relative efficiency of federal versus local provision of local public goods, a subject of much interest in the fiscal federalism literature.
A. Perfect Substitution
To avoid considerations of income redistribution, we assume that all citizens pay the same taxes. More precisely, all citizens of the federation pay the same federal taxes, and two citizens in the same district pay the same local taxes. Consider first a model in which the net utility of voter 
id id and he would not care whether this was provided through federal or local funds. We assume that for all
The federal and local policies are chosen through the following twostage game:
Stage 1: Each voter announces a proposed federal policy, and â s, federal policy s is determined byŝ p med{s }. It is straightforward to see that this game is strategically equivalent to the game studied in Section II. It is sufficient to think of s as the federal standard and as the policy implemented in district d. s ϩ y d Hence all the results discussed earlier hold.
A similar model would apply to "unfunded mandates," that is, federal laws that impose on local governments' minimum expenditures. It is sufficient to reinterpret s as the level of these unfunded mandates.
B. Local Provision Less Efficient than Public Provision
Up to now, we have worked with models in which there exists no reason to have a federal policy. Federal expenditures are sometimes defended on the grounds that they are more efficient than local expenditures. For instance, while discussing the decentralization of investment of infrastructure in developing countries, Smith and Shin (1995) write that "many infrastructure activities require large capital investments and exhibit significant scale economies. Some decentralized jurisdictions may be smaller than the minimum efficient size for particular activities" (p. 55).
To study the implications of such efficiency differences, we modify the utility function (2) and assume that it is of the type
where represents the relative efficiency of local spending a (0, 1] compared to public spending (a dollar of local spending increases the production of public goods by only a dollars) and represents the b ≥ 1 relative efficiency of local tax collection (a dollar of local tax collection decreases welfare by b dollars).
We assume that at least one of the two inequalities and a ! 1 b 1 1 holds, so that there are positive reasons for federal expenditures. Otherwise, the game proceeds in the same way as in Section IIIA.
It is convenient to define two "types" for voter (i, d): a federal type
which is his or her preferred level of public services if they were provided exclusively with federal funds, and a local type
which is his or her preferred supplies of public services if they were provided exclusively with local funds. We have The following lemma states formally the fact that any voter prefers that whatever level of public service is implemented be implemented as much as possible through federal spending.
Lemma 1. If and we have s ϩ ay p s ϩ ay p z s1 s ,
It is clear that, given any federal standard, s, chosen in the first stage, every voter has a dominant strategy to vote for a local policy equal to in the second stage of the game. Note that a voter could l max (s, t ) id wish that federal expenditures were higher and still not vote for additional local expenditures, since increasing public services through local funds is more expensive than increasing them through federal funds. This implies that given a federal policy s, the policy implemented in
Since this expression depends on the median in district d, we need to modify slightly our assumption about what each voter knows. Specifically, we assume that voters know the median ideal point of the other voters in their district. We are now ready to prove the following theorem, which describes the first-stage strategy of the voters.
Theorem 3. In the first stage, the unique dominant strategy of voter (i, d) is to vote for the policy l f max (m , t ). This suggests that it will be difficult to establish general welfare results about federal standards: clearly in this case there are good reasons to have federal standards. However, if we aggregate welfare, when a and b are close to one, the optimal federal policy is basically equal to the lowest median types among all the districts, but, as shown in the previous paragraph, the equilibrium policy will be much larger than this. The next section studies the welfare effects of federal mandates in more detail.
IV. The Welfare Effects of Federal Mandates
In this section, we consider two examples in order to make specific welfare comparisons between three different federal/local fiscal regimes: (1) only local provision, (2) only federal provision, and (3) mixed provision (both federal and local). The aim of the examples is to illustrate the range of effects induced by the presence of two levels of government.
To simplify the calculations, we approximate a large number of voters in a large number of districts by assuming a continuum of districts and a continuum of voters. We assume that the conditional measure of voters is the same in each district, so that each district is effectively the same size.
Districts differ from each other only by the distribution of ideal policies: The net utility functions of all voters have the quasi-linear form
where, as explained in Section III, s is the per capita level of the public good provided by the federal government in each district, and y d is the per capita level of the public good locally provided by district d. The preferences of agent (i, d) do not depend on his district (but the distributions of i will differ among districts), and i indexes his or her strength of preference for the public good. We refer to i as the type of voter (i, d). Below, we explore how federal and local expenditures vary as a function of b and of the distribution of preferences within and across districts.
We shall see that the distributions of types within and between districts affect crucially the relative social welfare induced by the three different possible constitutions. Furthermore, the social welfare in the constitution with both a federal and a local level does not vary monotonically with b. Indeed, an increase in b has two effects, which work in opposite directions: (1) it decreases welfare by making local provision of public goods more expensive, and (2) it increases welfare by diminishing the upward distortion to s.
A. Example 1
The parameter d, which indexes districts, is uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. In district d, voter types (i.e., the i's) are distributed uniformly on the interval (0, d] . To compare the different regimes, we first use the results of the previous section to derive the induced preferences and voting behavior under the three regimes. Then we compare the expected welfare of each regime as a function of the efficiency parameter, b, by integrating over the distribution of districts and types. Details of the computation are given in the Appendix.
Induced preferences.-Regime 1 (local): figure 1 , which illustrates four points. First, the regime with only federal spending is never optimal. Second, if federal spending is only slightly more cost-efficient than local spending, then the "only local" regime is optimal. Third, if the cost advantage of federal spending is sufficiently great, then the mixed regime is optimal. Fourth, in the mixed regime, welfare is not monotonic in b.
B. Example 2
In example 1, the distribution of types is skewed toward low levels. In this example, we consider a distribution of types that is symmetric around 0. Aggregate welfare.-The shape of aggregate welfare as a function of b is shown in figure 3 . When b increases, welfare first decreases and then increases, which is the opposite of example 1. Also in contrast to example 1, provision at both the local and federal levels is always dominated by 
V. Conclusion
In this paper, we have explored a new framework for studying the political economy of federal mandates. The basic insight is that even though voters are forward-looking and anticipate the effects of a federal mandate in changing local policy, incentives under majority rules may lead to adoption of federal mandates that make more voters worse off than better off. Local districts that would have a high policy level anyway are unaffected, but voters from districts that would have adopted a low level of provision of the local public good are made worse off. Surprisingly, the loss of efficiency due to the presence of a federal government can be even greater when federal provision of the public good is more efficient than local provision. Of course, our model abstracts from many features of reality, such as the roles of politicians or of interest groups. At the very least, we show that those groups that have a private interest in concentrating power at the federal level find a powerful ally in the voting behavior of the electorate.
We plan to extend our simple model in a number of directions. First, we shall allow for externalities between districts; that is, the utility of voter (i, d) will be of the type In this case, local u (y , … , y ) Ϫ y .
decisions are strategically linked to each other since voter preferences are contingent on the policy decisions of other districts, and the formal analysis is significantly complicated. Second, we would like to introduce in the model local agenda-setting monopolists à la Romer and Rosenthal (1979) , who argue that proposal power for local referenda rests in the hands of bureaucrats who have preferences that differ from those of the median voter. Then one can show that federal mandates determined by majority rule can dilute the power of local agenda-setting "policy monopolists" since policy monopolists need a low-status quo policy in order to give them agenda power. Federal mandates effectively raise the status quo, which reduces (in some cases completely nullifying) leverage of local policy monopolists, leading to a moderation of local policies (Crémer and Palfrey 1999a) . A third interesting extension is to allow voters to vote with their feet as well as in the voting booth, as in the Tiebout model of interjurisdictional equilibrium. This will make the preferences in each district more homogeneous and presumably alter the incentives of low-demand districts to accept federal mandates, since a very large proportion of their electorate would oppose them. More generally, this paper is part of a larger research program in which we are attempting to study the interplay between politics at the local level and at the federal level. In previous work (Crémer and Palfrey 1996, 1999b) , we study the constitutional stage in this light. We show that citizens will vote to transfer power from the local to the federal level after determining in which of these two levels their views are more likely to prevail. In the present paper, we assume that power has already been allocated between governmental levels and show how voters will use federal mandates in order to impose their preferred policies locally. This approach is in sharp contrast with most of the literature on federalism, in both economics and political science. In economics, the study of federalism, whether in the fiscal federalism literature or in the more recent regulation-type literature, models the local level through a representative agent. Only in Tiebout-type models does the difference in the tastes of the voters play a role, but the objective of the local government is given exogenously. In any case the equilibrium homogenizes the tastes of the local population. Peterson (1995) presents a useful summary of the political science literature, which he divides into two strands. The "functional theory," based on normative principles, assumes that the allocation of responsibilities is meant to manage externalities as efficiently as possible. Redistribution, which is a federal responsibility, plays an important role in the analysis. It does assume that citizens are different, but this is not exploited to study conflicts between citizens, at either the local or federal level. The "legislative theory," on the other hand, stresses the way in which legislators try to serve the interests of their voters, in particular, by maximizing the amount of pork barrel allocated to their districts, which have a homogeneous population.
Taking into consideration seriously the politics of the functioning of a federal system, as we are trying to do, opens up a host of questions and should eventually force a reconsideration of the theory of allocation of responsibilities between different levels of government. For instance, we have shown that it is in general detrimental to allow federal intervention when there is little or no efficiency reason for doing so. However, as argued in Section IIA, it is practically impossible to prevent in practice, and some issues will be open to federal intervention even with minimal external benefits or economies. A deeper study of this "delimitation problem" would be very valuable and could help provide a bridge between previous normative approaches and our positive approach. This would require a model with multiple issues and an equilibrium in which some issues involve federal intervention and others do not. 
In figure A1 we graph G(v) for the case of The horizontal axis is b p 1.50. a level of federal expenditure, and the vertical axis the proportion of voters who will have a vote smaller than this level.
The curved line is and the straight line is y p v Ϫ v ln v p v ln (e/v) y p b p 2.68. welfare under the mixed regime is obtained by integrating the expected welfare over all districts, and figure A2 shows its variation as a function of b. Notice that welfare is not necessarily decreasing in b as discussed in the Introduction: when it is small, welfare increases with b. That is, greater cost efficiency (at the local level) can lead to lower aggregate welfare.
The computations for example 2 are very similar in spirit and are available in a previous version of the paper, which the authors will be happy to provide on request.
